This September, President Vladimir Putin has, on several occasions including during the Collective Security Treaty Organization summit, voiced Russia's readiness to act against the ISIS as part of a broad coalition incorporating countries in the West and the Middle East. This prompts some questions. What does a broad coalition mean in this context? Does Russia intend to join the U.S.-led alliance? Will Moscow continue advancing cooperation with Tehran and Damascus while coordinating its moves with Western states to avoid clashes? How feasible is interaction of all or at least some of the players in Iraq and Syria that are engaged in operations against ISIS, which is viewed as a major global threat? The statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on September 10, 2015 goes some way to providing answers to these questions, as he said that the war against the ISIS is viewed by each participant as entirely individual, including due to the convoluted nature of relations between the various different state and non-state actors in the region.
In fact, it is theater shared by two parallel coalitions, i.e. the United States and Europe on the one side, and Russia, Iran and Syria on the other. The past two weeks have seen European states declaring their varying degrees of willingness to take a more active direct role in the Middle East conflict. The U.S. allies in the region are also expected to join the Western coalition, even though they often choose to pursue their own interests, which frequently run counter to U.S. aims. In order to back Russia's effort, the West would obviously have to make its peace with the government and army of Bashar Assad being rightful members of the coalition, at least as along as the war against the ISIS lasts. As of now, we see Western leaders slowly drifting in this direction. However, this scenario remains only a remote possibility. Given the current state of U.S.-Russia relations, it is hard to imagine Russian troops under U.S. command or even a loose coordination of operations with the Syrian Arab Army, if Americans are not open to direct contact with President Assad.
In order to avoid the need to deploy its own ground troops, Russia may try to expand the existing alliance with Iran and Syria by appealing to such neighbors as Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
At the same time, Russia and Iran continue to strengthen their cooperation in Syria and beyond, with their goal being to preserve its legitimate government. Russian and Iranian diplomats, generals and military experts have met several times in Moscow to coordinate their approach. A Russia-Iraq-Iran-Syria coordination center was recently established in Baghdad for planning operations against ISIS. Russia seems to have two opportunities under such a coalition. One involves a combination of missile and air strikes against ISIS positions plus engagement of its ground forces, and two, support for the Syrian army, Hezbollah contingents and Iranian volunteers with air strikes, logistics and intelligence. Although many global and regional actors would be happy to see Russian troops involved in ground operations against ISIS, this would not be desirable from Russia’s perspective because the inevitable losses would spark negative responses in Russia, reviving the ‘Afghan syndrome’ in Russian society’s collective consciousness. The second option is fraught with the same risks, although to a lesser extent. It would also be less efficient, since the Syrian army and its allies have all but exhausted their morale and physical resources. However, this is the scenario that seems to be developing, with Russia required to coordinate its operations with the U.S.-led coalition to avoid ‘collateral damage’ which would be undesirable for every party.
In order to avoid the need to deploy its own ground troops, Russia may try to expand the existing alliance with Iran and Syria by appealing to such neighbors as Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan. If this were to happen, then pressure on ISIS would mount, even though its crushing defeat would be by no means certain..
The Syrian crisis and the ensuing expansion of ISIS have triggered polarization in international relations, which complicates coalition building in the Middle East. In its anti-ISIS crusade, the United States has discovered to its dismay, that its allies are not willing to provide armies for a ground operation. The attempt to build a force comprising local combatants has failed, apparently prompting the resignation of General John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS.
U.S. foreign policy flops in the Middle East have opened avenues for other countries to step up their activities. Enjoying the status of the key U.S. partner, Great Britain has considerably expanded its regional presence. China has followed Russia's example to streamline its Middle Eastern policy, positioning itself as an economic and military-technical alternative to the United States. In addition to China’s other recent moves, the trend has prompted Russian China specialist Vitaly Naumkin to the ostensibly utopian but de factorealistic idea of establishing a Russian-Chinese counterterrorist coalition.
This would rest on several factors. First, China is expanding its military-political role in the region, building a naval base in Djibouti for about 1,000 PLA troops. Talks are ongoing regarding engaging the Snow Leopards, i.e. Chinese special operations forces, in counterterrorist operations in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Beijing has supplied UN peacekeepers in Lebanon and South Sudan with 1,000 troops each, in addition to 500 in Mali. Second, China is gravely concerned by the rise of jihad in its territory, especially after the Turkestan Islamic Party – a Uighur terrorist group – has been seen in Syria to capture an airbase. It also views the spread of ISIS affiliates in Asia and Africa as a clear threat. Third, Russian and Chinese forces are becoming increasingly operationally coherent thanks numerous joint land and sea exercises, which would be significant in any future joint anti-ISIS operations.
In its anti-ISIS crusade, the United States has discovered to its dismay, that its allies are not willing to provide armies for a ground operation.
Of course, there are certain limitations on China's Middle Eastern policy due to its ties with energy suppliers, primarily Saudi Arabia, as well as its intricate relationship with the United States. On the other hand, some U.S. officials seem to openly welcome involvement of China and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the war on ISIS. In any case, Chinese diplomacy is clearly testing the waters regarding joining just such a counterterrorist operation.
In terms of defeating ISIS, this latter scenario appears most feasible, although it is up to the interested leaders to take appropriate decisions.
First, Moscow has never concealed that it provides military-technical assistance to Damascus. This is done in accordance with international law and almost exclusively in the framework of signed contracts, as Russian officials constantly emphasize. At the same time, in the past, Moscow did not deliver weapons that could cause serious complications in Damascus’ relations with its neighbors. For example, in the recent past, Russia scrapped plans to supply S-300 anti-aircraft systems to Syria after Israel strongly opposed the deal on the grounds that the systems could cover practically the whole Israeli territory.
Second, the issue of fighting against the Islamic State (IS) has come to the fore. The United States and a number of coalition allies are already bombing IS positions in Syria. It is well-known that Russia has been calling for the formation of a broad coalition with the participation of global and regional powers to wage war against this evil, which Russia regards as a direct threat to its national security. Suffice it to say that from one single area in the Volga region, which is famed for its tolerance, no fewer than 200 people have already left to fight on the side of IS. This is to say nothing of the North Caucasus. The task of forming such a broad coalition is still far from being fulfilled.
Third, the moderate Syrian opposition forces, which are leading the fight on two fronts, are much weaker than the terrorists and are losing ground. According to Russian experts, the opposition controls about 5% of Syria’s territory, while almost half of the country is in the hands of IS. Under these circumstances, assistance to Damascus is viewed exclusively in the context of its struggle with the jihadists.
While Moscow has been particularly vocal in recent months on national reconciliation and developing contacts with many groups in the Syrian opposition, it continues to believe that the Syrian government is an ally to those who are fighting against IS and considers this fight a priority. As a Russian official told Al-Monitor on the condition of anonymity, “We believe that we aren’t helping President [Bashar al-] Assad as such, but the Syrian state, whose legitimate government sits in Damascus.”
According to reports, deliveries of arms and equipment from Russia to Syria have indeed increased. Some Russian media, citing conflict expert Yuri Lyamin — who blogs at imp-navigator — revealed a rise in the number of ships passing through the Black Sea straits in August and September. Lyamin speaks of the landing ships Novocherkassk, Azov, Karolev, Caesar Kunikov, Nikolay Filchenkov, as well as — for the first time — civilian ferry Alexander Tkachenko. Weapons, equipment, ammunition and supplies were delivered; trainers and advisers were dispatched.
Particular attention is being paid to the delivery of six supersonic interceptor MiG-31 fighter jets to Syria, in partial fulfillment of a 2007 contract, according to a Turkish news agency. It is clear that, due to their characteristics, these planes cannot be used to combat IS and are instead solely intended to protect the country’s airspace in view of potential external threats. These aircraft are able to control a frontline of 800-900 kilometers (497-559 miles).
Unsurprisingly, these reports are generating a flurry of rumors about Moscow’s direct involvement in the armed confrontation with Islamist extremists in Syria, something the Kremlin denies. When a reporter at the East Economic Forum, held Sept. 4 on Russky Island, asked whether Russia is ready to fight in the Middle East, President Vladimir Putin answered that it would be premature to address the subject: “We are considering various options, but what you mentioned is not on the agenda.”
These assurances, however, have failed to allay the concerns of the West, including the United States, as Secretary of State John Kerry told his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov in a telephone conversation Sept. 5. According to the anonymous source, one may wonder why Western air forces are allowed to strike IS positions inside Syria, while the Syrian air force — equipped with Russian weaponry — isn’t. At the same time, Russian public opinion is clearly against the direct participation of Russian troops in combat operations in the Middle East.
Russia, however, also delivers a large amount of humanitarian aid to Syria. Bulgaria’s decision to close its airspace Sept. 1-24 to Russian aircraft carrying humanitarian aid drew a negative reaction in Moscow. To reach Syria there are other air corridors, though it appears Greece granted a US request to cancel overflight permits for Russian airplanes bound for Syria. Russia has demanded an explanation from the authorities of these countries, and efforts to close down an air corridor between Russia and Syria — which journalists call the “Syria express” — are unlikely to succeed.
Another hot topic being discussed in the world media is the potential establishment of a full-fledged Russian naval base in Syria, in addition to the Russian navy’s logistic support station in Tartus, where a total of 50 people serve. Citing a source in the military-diplomatic field, the Sept. 3 issue of the Russian newspaper Argumenty Nedeli reported the possibility that Russia could install such a base in the coastal town of Jableh — which has a population of 80,000 people — near Latakia, “for the benefit of the navy, air force and special operations forces.”
For some analysts this is totally unrealistic. Nevertheless, the newspaper hypothetically broached the possible deployment at this base (were it to be built) of Pantsir S1 and Bastion missiles, Buk-M and even S-300PMU2 air-defense systems, which — provided the Syrian interceptor fighter jets were also deployed there — could foil any plan to enforce a no-fly zone.
One shouldn’t link Moscow’s plans to continue providing assistance to Damascus to Tehran’s plans. Iran is pursuing its independent policy toward the Syrian crisis, guided by its own national interests. Russia is doing the same, while also taking into account its developing relations with the Arab Gulf states. But could it be that the scale of the fight against IS in Syria will expand without the creation of a broad coalition of regional and global players, and even the necessary coordination — a fact that can only hinder success in this struggle?
Other questions are in order: How will the unfolding new round of confrontations affect prospects for a Syrian peace process? Will the intensified war of external actors — Western states and some regional countries — with IS and other terrorist groups stall progress toward implementing the provisions of the Geneva communique issued June 30, 2012, to end the civil war? The fact that lately Russia has dramatically broadened diplomatic contacts with various opposition groups, as well as meeting with Syrian officials, Western and Arab statesmen and diplomats, confirms Moscow has an interest in finding a political solution to the Syrian crisis. On this basis, it supported the plan of international mediator Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations’ special envoy for the Syria crisis. Will he be able to stop the bloodshed in Syria?
Russia is decidedly stepping up its Middle East policy, as evidenced, for example, by the number of visits to Moscow already held or planned for this year by heads of Arab states. The rulers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, and the crown prince of the United Arab Emirates, are expected to visit Russia before the end of 2015. Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud’s upcoming visit to Moscow this year is of particular importance, as it indicates Riyadh’s serious intention to improve relations with Russia. As is widely known, Russian President Vladimir Putin has accepted the Saudi king’s invitation to visit Riyadh.
An impressive number of leaders of various Syrian opposition groups also visited Moscow this month. The consultations did not reveal any fundamental change in the Kremlin’s Syria policy, but they did reveal the willingness of Russian diplomacy to have more frequent contact with the opposition.
Some basic features stand out in Russia’s policy toward the Syrian crisis. The first is a commitment to fighting terrorism and extremism, with the Islamic State (IS) as a top priority. Putin has called for creation of a broad international coalition to combat this scourge, starting from the premise that Damascus must be a member of this coalition, as it is already engaged in a war with IS. In this regard, there are obvious differences between Moscow’s approach, on the one hand, and on the other, that of the Syrian opposition and influential regional and global players.
The second feature is seeking a settlement of the Syrian crisis through peaceful, diplomatic means. Commitment to this principle unites Russia and the vast majority of its partners, though disagreements over its interpretation remain. A key question concerns establishing a transitional governing body in accordance with the Geneva Communique of June 30, 2012.
Russia has backed the plan of Staffan de Mistura, UN special envoy for Syria, which envisages an international contact group as well as four intra-Syrian working groups. The plan should be implemented as soon as possible, given the catastrophic humanitarian situation on the ground and the growing military potential of IS and other terrorist groups. However, according to sources from the diplomatic community, Washington intends to delay the creation of a contact group until October, when the agreement on the Iranian nuclear program will be definitively settled.
Unlike a number of its partners, Russia believes that only the Syrians can resolve the question of who should govern them and how, and categorically rejects any form of external interference in Syria, particularly in the form of military intervention.
Russian analysts believe Turkey’s plan to create a so-called security zone in northern Syria is unlikely to be implemented without direct Turkish intervention that could lead to a de facto Turkish-Kurdish war, as well as cause the unanimous condemnation of Arab governments. Many of those governments already consider the Turkish strikes on the territory of Iraq and Syria as a violation of the sovereignty of these two states.
Recently, however, some articles in Russian and foreign media raise the possibility that Russian commandos may be sent to Syria to evacuate Russian personnel, or to safeguard the technical maintenance unit of the Russian ships in Tartus and protect Russian arms supplies. The origin of those stories was a statement by the commander of the Russian Airborne Troops (VDV), Col. Gen. Vladimir Shamanov, who told reporters Aug. 4 that the VDV “are ready to assist Syria in countering terrorists, if such a task is set by Russia’s leaders,” provided the relevant UN Security Council mandate has been given. Ruslan Gorevoy, a journalist from the Russian newspaper Nasha Versiya, even claims — very provocatively and without basis — that “the decision to send military assistance to Syria has already been taken” and “in September a ‘limited contingent’ of the Russian army may be in Damascus.” For now, this is only the fervent (if not sick) imagination of that author speaking.
Let us return to the recent talks between Russian diplomats and some groups of the Syrian opposition, which this writer attended. On Aug. 14, after the discussions, the head of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, Khaled Khoja, stated, “Moscow is no longer committed to supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad unconditionally, and emphasizes the need to preserve the territorial integrity of the country.” This is both true and untrue. True, because Russia does not support individual leaders, but the states they lead. Untrue, because Russia strongly disagrees with the argument put forward by the opponents of Damascus that the Syrian leader has lost his legitimacy.
Moscow is well aware that a very large segment of the Syrian population continues to support not only the regime per se, but also its leader, though the number of his opponents is also large.
One can agree with the leader of the opposition coalition, however, that the Russian position is characterized by “flexibility and understanding.” And it is this that makes it possible for Moscow to continue contacts with all opposition groups except for those designated as terrorist. It can be assumed that Russian diplomacy will persevere in its efforts to consolidate the opposition on a moderate and negotiation-oriented platform.
It is true, though, as Russian media commented on Khoja’s statements after talks in Moscow, that the National Coalition has no plans to participate in the Moscow-supervised intra-Syrian dialogue, since Russia “wants to reach a compromise between the opposition and Assad to form a coalition against terrorism.”
Likewise, the Russian Foreign Ministry said it has urged Khoja to take an active part in developing “a constructive collective platform to begin dialogue with the government of the Syrian Arab Republic.”
Mutual understanding between Moscow and opposition groups such as the National Coalition will continue to be hindered by the fact that these groups equate IS and government forces. Still, there is some cause for optimism in that this opposition, like Russia and most global and regional actors, aims at preserving all state institutions in Syria, including the army, under any reform of the country.
Moscow believes a transitional governing body should be decided by consensus during inclusive negotiations among Syrians themselves. At the same time, Russian experts would like to see greater clarity in the strategy of the Syrian opposition in relation to the transition process. This applies, for example, to the issue of the future character of the Syrian state, which is a point of contention with leaders of the Kurdish groups. Compromise formulas like “democratic decentralization” or “pluralistic decentralization” look quite convincing, but they also elicit circumspection from the supporters of a centralized unitary state as well as all Arab nationalists. Still, it is clear to them that serious guarantees for the rights of all minorities in Syria are an essential element of any settlement.
One provision in the platform of the National Coalition and a number of other opposition groups that raises questions among Russian experts is the issue of so-called “transitional justice.” In this regard, it is feared that this principle could become an excuse to exact revenge against those whom the opposition wants to convince to share, or completely relinquish power. According to many analysts, the examples of South Africa, Cambodia and other countries — those which have experienced post-conflict transition while using the tool of amnesty and refusing to take revenge — look quite appealing.
The article was initially published in Al Monitor: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/arab-monarchs-syria-opposition-russia-visits.html#
British Prime Minister David Cameron devoted his recent speech in Birmingham to the struggle against religious extremism, primarily Islamic. This speech is a prelude to the expected publication of a new five-year strategy for combating extremism. Apparently, it reflects the main elements of this strategy, above all, the need for the ideological consolidation of Britain’s civil society.
Describing the current state of affairs, Cameron emphasized ISIS's attractiveness for a considerable number of young Brits. According to various estimates, from 700 to 1,500 Brits have joined ISIS since 2012. Cameron mentioned four main reasons why ISIS seems so attractive: the question of identity, ISIS’s “energizing” nature, its appealing ideological concepts based on radicalism and a conspiracy-based world view, and finally, the fact that extremists are allowed “to set the terms of the debate”: “Ask yourself, how is it possible that when young teenagers leave their London homes to fight for ISIL, the debate all too often focuses on whether the security services are to blame? And how can it be that after the tragic events at Charlie Hebdo in Paris, weeks were spent discussing the limits of free speech and satire, rather than whether terrorists should be executing people full stop?”
Describing ways of countering these four root causes of extremism, Cameron emphasized the need to oppose ISIS’s mad ideas with traditional British values: freedom of speech and assembly, sexual equality, multiculturalism (sic!), freedom of convictions, a parliamentary system, etc.
All this is very typical and indicative.
First, the Birmingham speech in and of itself demonstrates the growing importance of fighting extremism in the domestic political arena, and this applies not only to the United Kingdom but to many other countries as well.
Second, unlike many domestic analysts who speak about the failure of multicultural policy, Cameron sees it as the foundation of the British nation and one of its basic values.
Third, to follow the logic of the British Government, the fight against ISIS should primarily be waged on the ideological front, thereby promoting the consolidation of society, and this is an important point.
In fact, this is a confrontation of two systems of values or two “soft powers”: Britain's “soft power” versus ISIS's “soft power”. Britain’s “soft power” means Western “soft power”; all British values mentioned by Cameron are identical to European or liberal values.
In general, a striving to consolidate a value-based identity has become a trend of the past year across the most diverse countries. Speaking at Al-Azhar University last January, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi urged Islamic scholars to create “a revolution inside Islam.” He said a bunch of extremists should not be allowed to speak on behalf of a world religion.
It would be appropriate to mention in this context numerous initiatives of Muslim intellectuals, decisions adopted by the Organization of Islamic Conference on countering the ISIS threat and new programs on the development of Islamic education in Tunisia.
It is also possible to recall the Russian Government's stake on enhancing patriotism and traditional values. Statements in this vein have been made throughout the past year. Although in the Russian case the ideological quest is primarily determined by the confrontation with the West rather than the extremist danger, the ISIS threat is playing a key role in some Russian regions (primarily Chechnya). Typically, the British and Russian (especially Chechen) concepts of countering extremism are built on opposite logic to a certain extent. The British Government insists on the consolidation of liberal values while Cameron is indignant over the debates on freedom of speech following the Charlie Hebdo tragedy. In the meantime, the Russian Government is trying to demonstrate its super-conservative attitudes, in religion as well. It is no accident that participants in numerous rallies in Chechnya and other Muslim regions of Russia protested against cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad rather than supporting the victims of the terrorist act.
It's clear that attempts to confront ISIS ideologically are an admission of the inability to deal with it militarily, and not only because ISIS is stronger than, say, al-Qaeda, but also because the world has become weaker. It simply does not know how to defeat ISIS (nor does it know how to defeat the Taliban or what to do about Libya, Syria and Iraq).
At the same time, placing emphasis on extremism (which may be embodied not only by ISIS but also by nationalists) has become a convenient instrument for consolidating societies. To a certain extent, the authorities are interested in exaggerating the threat. Cameron compares ISIS with the ideologies of nationalism and communism.
Finally, the most important point is that the popularity of extremism compels the governments of the most diverse countries to revise their own value systems. The problems that societies are facing along this path in Britain, Russia and a number of Arab countries are not political and not even ideological, but philosophical. They lie in the deteriorating crisis of the world outlook that has taken shape in the modern era. This crisis, which was described by post-modernist philosophers half a century ago, is now entering its final stage, in which ideological concepts resting on a certain philosophical basis – cogito ergo sum – no longer allow people to answer major existential questions. The absence of answers prompts people to seek consolation in archaic philosophical systems like those of ISIS or neo-Nazis, whom Cameron also mentions.
The common feature of these systems is their emphatic anti-humanism, which allows them to find in the surrounding world values that are more important than humans.
Politicians, propagandists, journalists or advertisers cannot win the battle against such philosophies, such worldviews, but it can be won by intellectuals, whose philosophical ideas have become an urgent political necessity.
Previously published by Valdai Club
Russian version of the article was exclusively published by IMESClub: http://imesclub.org/ru/component/k2/item/370-fighting-softpower-isis
The international community is appalled by the scale of destruction of unique ancient monuments of Middle Eastern cultures and the shameless trafficking in cultural artifacts pillaged in territories controlled by the Islamic State, al-Qaeda and other radical militant groups. Irreparable damage is also taking place in areas that have become war zones where combat aircraft and artillery are used in the course of coups, interventions and internal conflicts.
Archaeological landmarks of unique value to humanity have been destroyed and looted in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya. It would be a mistake to believe that this process did not start until after the Arab Spring of 2011. Coalition forces failed to prevent the destruction and looting of valuable relics by militants in Iraq after a 2003 invasion that created a power vacuum there. According to Mostafa Amin, chairman of Egypt’s Supreme Council of Antiquities, more than 170,000 Iraqi artifacts have been stolen and smuggled during the conflict in Iraq since that time.
However, this cultural devastation reached truly tragic proportions only after jihadi fanatics took control of a number of territories in the Arab world. Three trends can be identified in this recent process of destruction and looting of the cultural heritage of the Arab states.
First, it is a systematic destruction of monuments resulting in an irretrievable loss of entire layers of humankind’s cultural heritage. In some instances, this destruction is purposeful and planned, as was the case with the ancient Parthian city of Hatra in Iraq (founded in the third century B.C.), a UNESCO World Heritage site that was razed to the ground by IS barbarians. In another case, Akkadian and Assyrian antiquities from the once-vast collection of the Mosul Museum were destroyed. There are many other notorious examples of the destruction of monuments in Iraq and Syria. Also, these bigots have not spared numerous mosques that did not conform to their dogmatic standards.
In certain situations, the destruction is collateral damage from hostilities — bombing raids, shelling and ground operations. One graphic example is in Yemen, where an offensive launched by Ansar Allah, or the Houthis, and their allies in February sparked ground clashes between the opposing groups. The clashes were followed by airstrikes from a Saudi-led coalition, resulting in catastrophic humanitarian fallout. Shelling the night of May 11 and the morning of June 12 resulted in the destruction of historical buildings and monuments in the Maqshamat Al-Qasimi neighborhood of the Old City of Sanaa, one of the most fascinating ancient towns of Arabia and another World Heritage site.
According to a UNESCO report quoted at the Experts Meeting on the Safeguarding of Yemen’s Cultural Heritage, held July 15-16 at the organization’s Paris headquarters, a splendid museum in Damara was completely destroyed May 12. The Great Dam of Marib, a unique landmark of the Kingdom of Saba considered by many to be the Eighth Wonder of the World, was seriously damaged June 2 and, the same day, the domed mausoleum of al-Habib bin Sheik Abu Bakr bin Salem in Hadhramaut was completely destroyed. A similar fate is likely to await all the other strikingly beautiful tombs of holy men that ended up in the area controlled by al-Qaeda jihadists who denounce these monuments as "shirq" — idolatry or a departure from the worship of the one and only god. At the same time, as UNESCO Director General Irina Bokova said at the meeting in Paris, “This heritage bears the soul of the Yemeni people, it is the symbol of a millennial history of knowledge and it belongs to all humankind."
There is ongoing systematic destruction of anthropomorphic and zoomorphic sculptures that the IS doctrine considers to be idols that have no place in the raving extremists’ hideous “state,” based on grossly distorted Islamic beliefs.
The second trend involves illegal and chaotic excavations designed to loot valuable artifacts for sale and at the same time destroy important landmarks of pre-Islamic civilizations. Initially, barbaric and disorderly archaeological digs in IS-controlled territory were conducted by criminal gangs, but the situation seems to have changed over time. Efforts to maximize the proceeds from this criminal activity have made it somewhat systematic. The IS militants established a ministry of artifacts after they took control over the city of Tadmor in May. А webpage, created under the name “Syria’s Artifacts for Sale,” displays some of the precious artifacts that were looted from museums in Halab, Deir ez-Zor and Qalamoun — statues, jewelry, precious stones and coins. A researcher from Tajikistan, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Al-Monitor that IS emissaries are recruiting archaeologists in the region, and probably in other countries as well, to conduct illegal excavations in IS-occupied territories in Iraq and Syria. According to the Regional Center for Strategic Studies in Cairo, experts from neighboring countries, including Turkey, are recruited to conduct excavations in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Idlib, while metal detectors and archaeological extraction tools are brought from along with weapons. Organized excavation teams are formed from Syrian militants.
Also, according to Cairo-based RCSS, IS imposes taxes on excavation operations that are assessed at 20% of the value of artifacts extracted from the city of Halab, and at 50% for artifacts extracted from the city of Raqqa. Gold artifacts of the Islamic era are taxed even more heavily. IS has also been destroying monuments and conducting illegal excavations in coastal Libya, including in the vicinity of Leptis Magna, a famous city founded in 1100 B.C. as a Phoenician colony, only 130 kilometers (80 miles) from the capital, Tripoli. Rich museum collections have also been looted in Libya.
Credit is due to the Syrian government for having evacuated many monuments from the sites targeted by the terrorists, moving them to secure storage facilities in Damascus.
The third trend is the smuggling of antiquities abroad and their sale in the black market, currently one of the main revenue sources for IS. Despite serious efforts mounted by the international community, international organizations and individual countries, including Arab states, to counter an illegal cross-border trade in stolen artifacts, the trade is still flourishing. Stolen artifacts are carried over secret trails across the borders of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, and end up in the hands of black-market dealers who deliver them to buyers. According to RCSS experts, particularly valuable items such as weapons with golden ornaments sell for as much as $50,000. In February 2013, Jordanian police busted an underground network of traders in Syrian antiquities that operated on the Syrian border close to the city of Daraa. A similar operation was conducted by Algerian police against a network of dealers in stolen Libyan antiquities in April 2015.
What we are witnessing today is an intolerable situation that calls for concerted and resolute action by the entire international community to stop the destruction and looting of humankind’s cultural heritage in the Middle East. In addition to police and legislative efforts, action is required in the culture domain. The subject appeared on the agenda of the RCSS experts’ meeting in Yemen, hosted by UNESCO and attended by a representative of Russia, Alexander Sedov, curator of the Museum of O.r iental Arts. Notably, a Russian archaeological mission has been working in Yemen since 1983. It has conducted archaeological excavations at the ancient settlements in Hadhramaut and on Socotra Island for more than 30 years. Sedov told Al-Monitor about discussions in Paris that included the possible development of a satellite-based system for monitoring loss of and damage to monuments, UNESCO cooperation with specialists on Yemen, the exchange of information on stolen artifacts and implementation of an action plan designed to draw more attention from governments and the public to this vexing problem.
Washington and Moscow have been recently trying to find common ground in resolving the Syrian crisis. Attempts have been made via phone calls between Presidents Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin, as well as through diplomatic contacts and expert consultations. The two sides have been assessing each other’s positions, limits and flexibility to make concessions.
Following these efforts, Obama decided to authorize air protection for U.S.-trained Syrian rebels fighting against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by bombing any force that attacks them, including the Syrian army.
Washington is thereby pressing Moscow and Damascus, and showing them how far it is ready to go to achieve a transition in Syria, as it had previously been reluctant to involve U.S. military forces.
The decision to form an international coalition to hit ISIS in Iraq and Syria has caused much anxiety in Damascus and Moscow, as they expected Washington to use this opportunity to target the Syrian army.
By authorizing the protection of rebel forces, Washington is constricting the corridor for negotiations. Remarkably, this decision was announced just before the trilateral meeting in Doha of Russian, American and Saudi officials, whose agenda included Syria.
Moscow and Washington understand the importance of the transition of power in Syria. In Doha, they renewed their call for a managed political transition. The difference between Washington and Moscow is in the perception of when it should be done. Russia considers the highest priority now to be the fight against ISIS, in which Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a partner.
However, in a strategy that has not yet produced anything positive, Washington is trying to solve the Syrian internal problem and fight ISIS simultaneously. The problem is that the Syrian army is still one of the forces on the ground containing the spread of ISIS. Without the army, ISIS could spread further and take Damascus.
There is currently little hope for an adequate political transition, with more than 4 million Syrians as refugees, and disagreement over the mechanisms behind such a transition and the figures to be included.
Another problem is that Russia’s influence on the Syrian regime is highly overestimated. Assad is not an easy counterpart to press and to push, and will not leave his post in the near future. By threatening to hit his army if it attacks U.S.-trained rebels, Washington is trying to convince him otherwise.
As U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter told lawmakers, only 60 recruits have passed their training. Already half the $500 million budget has reportedly been spent. Washington expects to have 3,000 recruits by the end of the year, so it is easy to see how high expenses will rise. Taking into account the estimated size of ISIS – between 20,000 and 200,000 militants – the number of trained rebels is a drop in the ocean.
By authorizing the protection of rebel forces, Washington is constricting the corridor for negotiations.
Maria Dubovikova
With air protection, they will hardly ever be involved in fighting as any battle will be prevented by massive U.S. airstrikes. Another problem is that if they are trained like the post-Saddam Iraqi army was, they will be virtually useless.
Thus announcing air protection for rebels is mostly a pretext for intervening in the Syrian crisis and sending a strong message to Damascus and Moscow. The possibility of a transition of power in Syria remains a distant prospect.
Migration flows in the Mediterranean are nothing new. According to the official data, an average of almost 40,000 people (on the basis of monitoring between 1998-2013) cross the Mediterranean sea per year to reach its northern shores. It’s a drop in the sea if we were to compare this figure to the numbers of immigrants admitted to the EU every year, that is reportedly over 1.5 million persons.
South to North migration in the Mediterranean is a given reality preconditioned by the differences in the development between the two shores of the Mediterranean, and by the challenges and problems in the southern part as well. In other words, by the issues plaguing Africa and the Middle East. Running from extreme poverty, low levels of living quality, and conflicts, the issues are forcing people to seek a better life in the developed Western world, notably in Europe.
However, dreams about the European paradise soon crumble as the migration flows are more intensive than the capabilities of the receiving side and the final destination is far from paradise itself. The problem resides also in the historical insufficiency and inadequacy of the measures in the majority of the receiving countries to effectively integrate the newcomers into society. It is the aggregate disillusionment of newcomers and the limited migration policy that creates a delayed-action bomb in Western societies.
A profound, nearly civilizational rift and continuously escalating strife in the Middle East are prodding Russia to exercise exceptional flexibility as it seeks to hold on to a foundation of friendly relations with key, if not all, regional players that have taken many decades to build. The nature of these relations is determined by historical memories, as Russia had never been a colonial power in the area, and during the Soviet era invariably supported Arab national liberation movements, helped create industrial potential in many nations in the region and backed the Palestinian cause. In more recent years, however, it has had to work to mitigate the fallout of the conflict in Chechnya in the 1990s, as a number of Middle Eastern states sympathized with the separatists, and of its policy stance regarding the ongoing Syrian conflict. With respect to the latter, regional players have been showing signs of better understanding Russia’s position.
In this context, Moscow is striving to further diversify its system of regional partnerships, relying not only on effective tools of diplomacy, but also on military-technical cooperation, an area where it has a thing or two to offer its partners. In this area, more than anywhere else, economic interests — which have grown particularly strong against the backdrop of international sanctions against Russia — are closely intertwined with political interests.
Among the more competitive offerings of the Russian defense industry are air defense systems, particularly the S-300 (S-400, S-500) surface-to-air missiles capable of upgrades. For years, Moscow has been trying to market them in the Middle East only to run up against fierce resistance from strong competitors. Even progress ostensibly made has occasionally been marred by setbacks. Russia has on two occasions had to cancel contracts to supply S-300s in the Middle East. The first occurred when a 2010 deal to provide Syria with four battalions of S-300PMU2s, worth about $1 billion, had to be put on hold for a year in 2013 after Israeli threats against the buyer. The deal eventually had to be canceled altogether. Some of the components of the SAM systems that had already been delivered had to be disposed of in situ, while others were used to meet obligations under other contracts.
Estimations of the size of the ISIS army differs from 20,000 to 200,000 militants. What is clear is that the recruitment drive is intensifying. Recruiters fuel the ISIS forces coming both from the territories taken by ISIS and the web it effectively uses as its soft power.
ISIS–held territory is rich in natural recourses and the negligence of some players provides them with the financial capital needed to make their system function and to guarantee its relatively stable existence.
The recent trends show that ISIS recruitment doesn’t only seek to make people come to the territories of the self-proclaimed Caliphate, but to make each recruiter a terrorist cell himself: its leader, member and soldier.
There is no more need for sophisticated, expensive terrorist plans. After the Arab Spring, the Libyan collapse and the devastating consequences of the Syrian civil war and the Iraqi collapse, access to weapons that flooded the region became an easy matter.
The over-simplified scheme of luring in vulnerable minds with false religious promises is still being practiced in such places as Tunisia. For the most part, ISIS members are far from representatives of the prosperous, successful and well-educated circles of society. They emerge mostly from the most socially risky underprivileged classes, who have a limited future in the societies to which they belong, or just have a strong feeling of the unfairness of the world and system they live in. Some people are joining ISIS to achieve Paradise, some for money, some for equity that the supposed Islamic State also promises. So, ISIS has the most dangerous army, full of blind and thoughtless people with already washed out brains and a strong feeling of resentment and the will to fight for their miserable state.
We should be ready to witness the new destruction of the World Heritage monuments, to witness and to “thank” world leaders for making all this nightmare possible through their lack of will
Thus there are many scenarios of ISIS’ survival as a state or state-like structure and one can only guess at when it will collapse. And even its collapse also promises nothing good to the international community. Thus, both options have negative elements, one more than the other, either ISIS will stay or ISIS will fall.
On the one hand we have the most probable development of the situation, in which ISIS will stay and all the current effort of the international community will collapse as it is ineffective and out-of-date in the face of the new challenges.
To read the whole article: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/07/08/Any-decision-on-ISIS-is-too-little-too-late.html
The well-known recent gains by jihadists in Syria and Iraq, both in the military and the political spheres, have become an issue of serious concern for the Russian leadership. Unlike the West and many regional partners in the fight against terrorism, Russia continues to see Syrian President Bashar al-Assad — possibly to an even greater extent than before — as an important ally in this struggle, and one who is almost single-handedly leading the fight. This is not the main point of contention, however. If those who refuse to cooperate with the government in Damascus on this basis believe that the jihadist wave will subside with Assad’s departure, in Moscow they are convinced that this will mean victory for Islamist radicals who will come to power in Damascus and then expand.
As is known, Moscow’s support for an inclusive national dialogue as the only possible way out of the Syrian crisis prompted the Russian Foreign Ministry to hold two inter-Syrian consultative meetings this year in the Russian capital with the participation of a number of opposition and civil society groups, as well as a delegation of the Syrian government, in which I acted as a moderator. These meetings appear to have played a positive role, if only because the conflicting parties listened to one another for a few days. They reaffirmed their commitment to exclusively political and peaceful means to resolve the crisis, to the principles of the Geneva Protocol dated June 30, 2012, and to the need for a Geneva III conference. They even managed to (almost) agree on a number of very sensitive issues and that in the next phase of consultations, they would begin discussing the most difficult problem, namely a transitional governance system for the country. Intransigence on a number of the most pressing challenges interrupted the dialogue and prevented progress, however.
In the course of the second meeting, held April 6-9, representatives of the opposition forces worked to develop a joint document to submit to the government delegation, but differences continued to divide them regarding the current situation (for instance, the withdrawal of foreign fighters and militias from the country) and the future of Syria (for example, whether the country will be a unitary or a decentralized federal state). The document produced at the "Moscow platform," which consisted of 10 principles, was initially agreed upon by all parties, only to be subsequently disavowed by a number of them, who were dissatisfied with the obstinacy of the official delegation. Still, the meeting was a unique achievement that no other intermediary country can afford to hold in such a format, namely with the participation of Damascus. Some of the Syrian opposition representatives also sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on the need to convene a Geneva III conference.
After the second meeting, the question arose as to whether it would be worth continuing meeting in the same format. There is no answer to this question yet, but it is possible that new initiatives are needed, and in Moscow they are currently pondering this. Russia continues to have influence on the conflicting parties and encourage them to search for compromises. In this context, Moscow is looking closely at the efforts of the UN special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, who on May 5 began in Geneva a six-week round of meetings with representatives of various Syrian groups and the Syrian government with the aim of then developing a road map for a political settlement in Syria.
After a meeting with the special envoy, Moscow-based Qadri Jamil — secretary of the People’s Will Party and a member of the leadership of the Popular Front for Change and Liberation — declared, "The positions of the parties are well known and further consultations will yield no results unless practical steps are taken to start implementing the commitments of Geneva I, held in 2012." The opposition member believes that there is now a need to make the warring parties fulfill the Geneva Protocol, as "appeals are no longer sufficient and the talks will not give any result." The diplomatic corps in the Russian capital are only trying to guess whether and to what extent Jamil’s words reflect Moscow’s official position.
Without waiting for a decision by the Kremlin on whether a Moscow III is necessary, a group of opposition members — led by Paris-based Randa Qassis, chairwoman of the Movement for a Pluralistic Society — seized the initiative to hold consultation meetings (leading some Russian analysts to suggest that French government agencies are behind this idea). They appealed to Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev to organize such an event in Astana. Moscow has never sought to monopolize the role of mediator and reacted favorably to this initiative and others — including meetings in Cairo — aimed at ending the violence in the country. The Syrian government, however, has not expressed interest in participating in the meeting in Astana, which took place May 25-27. The majority of the 27 participants representing several opposition groups also managed to agree on a document of principles to solve the crisis.
Two of those principles are especially significant. The first is the decentralization of Syria, as well as granting the Kurds and the Assyrians the right to "defend their territory against any form of terrorism." The experience of the negotiations in the "Moscow platform" indicates that this idea met with sharp opposition from Arab nationalists in both the government and part of the opposition. And the Kurds, while speaking of Syria's unity, are very unlikely to renounce their already de facto autonomy in the country’s northeast.
The second is the withdrawal of all foreign fighters. If we return again to the experience of the "Moscow platform," I highlight that this statement caused heated debate among the participants. Both representatives of the government in Damascus and a whole range of opposition groups are categorically opposed to equating Hezbollah’s units with foreign jihadists. The reason is that without the help of the Lebanese Shiite militia, the country could have already fallen victim to the Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat al-Nusra. In addition, Hezbollah fighters were invited by the legitimate government and if — purely hypothetically — their units leave the country in an organized fashion on orders from Beirut, there is no such force that would be able to compel all foreign jihadists to exit Syria.
It is not surprising that not all participants in Astana agreed to sign such a document, with six of them writing a separate statement. It is unclear whether the Kazakh government intends to convene Astana II.
As for Moscow, the rising number of extremists traveling to fight in Syria — both from within Russia and from Central Asia — is a subject of growing concern. In this context, the high-profile case of Col. Gulmurod Halimov — the commander of the Tajik elite paramilitary police unit who fled Dushanbe along with a dozen of his subordinates to join IS — was an unpleasant surprise for both the Central Asian governments and Russia.
Not only has the commander, who clearly has no lack of charisma and has been trained in Russia and the United States, joined the ranks of the jihadists, but he has also addressed his compatriots with an appeal to come to wage jihad in a video on the Tajikistan Live web portal. Many Russian analysts fear that the colonel-turned-jihadist’s appeal can attract, in particular, some of the migrant workers from Tajikistan in Russia, whose total number exceeds 1.2 million. They can either join the 4,000 Central Asian nationals already fighting in Syria for IS, or enter the so-called sleeper cells that IS is establishing in the territory of many countries. I was told about the existence of such cells by a former IS member in Syria who spoke on condition of anonymity. As suggested by Russian analyst Arkady Dubnov, people could be drawn by the criticism leveled at Dushanbe for prohibiting Muslims "to fully celebrate their ceremonies, as well as for closing down mosques" and persecuting the legitimate Islamic Renaissance Party, which "is an alternative to radical Islamic groups."
It is easy to assume that all of this was discussed during a recent meeting between President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State John Kerry in Sochi. Kerry stressed that Syria will not return to peace until there is a political transfer of power. Russia and the United States agreed to continue their dialogue to find a settlement for Syria in the coming weeks. Assessing the outcome of the meeting May 29, US Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Richard Stengel said that the interests of Moscow and Washington may overlap when it comes to the situation in Yemen, Libya, Syria and the agreement with Iran.
Russia is ready to develop cooperation with the West and the countries of the region in the fight against terrorism. Speaking May 31 on the program "At the heart of events" on Russian TV channel TVC, Lavrov stated that for this cooperation to work, it requires, first of all, "developing a strategy based on a fair joint assessment under the auspices of the Security Council," and second, "adopting resolutions that will legitimize the actions to be taken to combat this threat," be it IS, Jabhat al-Nusra or any other group.
An amusing photo has been doing the rounds on social media, depicting “the international community” as being solely comprised of Western states, or Western-affiliated states.
When media reports or politicians say “the international community approves” or “the international community disapproves,” they are really only talking about these countries, forgetting the rest of the world.
While the leaders of the international community discuss the prolongation of sanctions against Russia at the G7 meeting, Russia and Egypt have had their first ever naval drills. The goal of the eight days maneuver was to strengthen military cooperation between the naval forces of the two countries in the interest of security and stability at sea. Earlier, in late May, Russia and China also strengthened their cooperation and ties through military exercises in the Mediterranean, apparently reminding “the international community” that the countries of the rest of the world do exist and their interests and their perception of the global agenda should be taken into account, and what is more, it could differ a lot from what “the international community” thinks.
In the current circumstances, when relations between the West and Russia are at a low point, the alliance between Russia and Egypt reminds us of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship in the difficult times of the Cold War. Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was among the guests of the Victory Day celebrations in Russia, a sign of the warm relations between the two countries. Nuclear cooperation as well as tourism also highlight warming relations.
However, military cooperation is one of the most successfully developing spheres, and it forms the bases of the general cooperation between the two countries.
The strategic alliance between the two countries is neither a threat to the stability of the countries of the Northern Mediterranean, nor a muscle-flexing game
Maria Dubovikova
The temptation of building parallels of analogies between the present and the past is sweet but much better avoided. The current confrontation is not a new Cold War, at least not yet. This friendship doesn’t have a confrontational core — this friendship is not modeled against other camps or countries.
The sides are motivated to draw together due to common interests, common threats and expected mutual benefits. Russia is not the Soviet Union; it has a market economy, it is integrated in the international trade. The Western sanctions and reciprocal measures taken by the Kremlin have struck the internal economy and pushed the country to the diversification of economic ties, needed long time ago though, thus pushing it towards Asia, Africa, South America and the Middle East. Relations with Egypt are important for Russia, but pale in importance and significance to its ties with China and neighboring countries. Russia does not have so much to propose to Egypt to take it in its orbit completely. Furthermore, the existing stereotypes, narrow-mindedness and perceptions deep in the Russian mentality about Egypt, formed mostly in the pools of the all-inclusive Egyptian resorts, ignorance about the country’s history and culture, worsened by the moderate Russian chauvinism towards the Arab world, don’t contribute to the development of relations on the level of civil societies, and even of business circles, thus anchoring the speed of bilateral relations development.
Egypt is not limited by its ties with Russia from doing business with other countries. It takes considerable attempts to attract investments from all over the world in its huge economy that needs to be well fueled to kick start considerable growth - its potential is truly enormous. Egypt recently signed a historical military cooperation protocol with France. It is also upholding traditional ties with the U.S., however, the trust has been undermined.
The epoch of ideology affiliation is over, and logic of ties is dictated by economy, business and other political interests, preconditioned by the internal demands.
The bilateral relations between the two countries are cemented by the truly warm personal relations between national leaders, who have much in common: both strong, powerful and charismatic. The multi-confessional core of the counties, that in the case of Egypt faced a dramatic threat under the Muslim Brotherhood, unites the countries, as well as a moderate conservatism and illiberal democracy that is installed within their borders and raises much criticism from “the international community.”
The strategic alliance between the two countries is neither a threat to the stability of the countries of the Northern Mediterranean, nor a muscle-flexing game. However, the “international community” has too much temptation to look at the matter in this way, especially taking into account the current confrontation between Russia and the West. Mostly it’s a reminder that there is life beyond the borders of “the international community,” that there are players strong enough to form alliances and to have military drills in “the international community’s” backyard. Taking into account the global challenges and threats the world now faces, the strategic alliance between Egypt and Russia should mostly be welcomed, as cooperation between them has a direct influence on the security situation in the regional space and thus is in the interests of all players.
The Yemeni Houthis are among the main motives for the intervention in Yemen by Saudi Arabia led coalition that started on the 25th March 2015. The Houthis are not tolerated not only by Saudi Arabia, but also by the US – both leading sponsors of the manageable political process in Yemen that was launched in 2011.
The Houthis were accused of being an Iranian “Trojan horse” that has infiltrated the back areas of Saudi Kingdom. The war in Yemen is interpreted as a proxy war where Saudi Arabia has faced Iranian agents – the Houthis, who had committed a coup in order to seize power in Yemen. The leading international media controlled by the US and the UK have been playing a major role in demonization of the Houthis for long time.
The unusual feature of the Yemeni case is that the country has been de-facto under the mandate of the UN for more than three years, which prioritized the realization of the two-step peace settlement plan of Yemeni crisis – the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)initiative. Even President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi who has replaced Ali Abdullah Saleh, a dictator, who ruled the country for many years, in February 2012, was nothing more than a designated person who was entrusted to carry out the peace plan of the transition issued by the international community. The Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the UN Jamal Benomar was a second person appointed for this task by the UN Security Council.
The Saudi intervention that was formally provoked by President Hadi’s speech on the 23d March 2015 has in fact rendered futile the long Benomar’s mission. His resignation on the 16th of April 2015 was followed by a number of shocking declarations with the worst assessments of Saudi military intervention that, from his point of view, has ruined the pretty likely possibility of successful completion of the transition and the termination of the severe crisis in Yemen.
The falseness of the thesis about the connections between the Houthis (Ansar Allah movement) and Iranian agents is evident for the experts. Thus, the leading US orientalists have strongly condemned the Saudi intervention in Yemen as well as the supportive role of the US and the UK governments. In Washington Post they declared that they were well aware of the internal divides in the Yemeni society, but that they strongly believed that the Yemeni should be given an opportunity to negotiate the political settlement themselves.
The Houthis see the intervention as yet another act of adversity by the ruling Saudi dynasty towards Yemen. They believe that the Saudi wish to crush Yemen by the ideology of religious intolerance towards both Zaidiyya(the Shia) and the Yemeni Shafi'i (the Sunni) with the support of the Wahhabiwing of Muslim Brotherhood within the Islah party and of the terrorist structures of Al-Qaeda. According to Houthis the Saudi consider the prevention of the victory of the Yemeni patriots the key element of the general plan to divide the country.
They also consider the war as the indication of fear of the regional reaction to the Yemeni revolution that started in February 2011 and that has brought Yemen closer to a true national rebirth after the hard series of crises.
There are four stages of development of the Houthis as a political movement:
The birth stage covered the period of 1997-2001, when Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, Zaydi, representative of an ancient Hashemitecleric clan of Sadah, became the head of the Zaydi movement “Shabab al-Mumin”. Disillusioned by the Zaydi party al-Hakk, we has turned his attention to the youth and charitable social projects. His concerns were focused on the protection on the Zaydi cultural heritage from the attacks of the Wahhabipreachers, who had declared Zaidiyyaa heterodoxy (Takfir) and were trying to completely eliminate it.
The Wahhabiactivity in Yemen was led by a radical wing of the Muslim Brotherhood of Sheikh Abdelmajid al-Zindani, which together with the tribal group of Hashed Sheikh Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar formed a core of Islah party. Islah has firmly occupied the second line of the Yemeni political parties rating, with the party of power of President Saleh (GPC) on the first place after the unification of the two Yemeni states in 1990 and with YSP, the party of the South, on the third place. The success of Islah was assured by the generous Saudi funding. A wide network of Salafi schools “Maahid Yl’miya” was founded in 1970 under the aegis of Islah. The political support of the Salafiproselytism by the republic’s government back in the 1979 has allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to open a big religious educational center in Sadah, the native city of Yemeni Zaydis, Dar al-Hadis, that has become a source of sectarian conflicts between the Zaydis and the Salafi.
The second stage of the Houthi movement took the period from the end of 2001 to June 2004 and was characterized by the increase of the fields of activity of “shabab mumin” movement and by the simultaneous adoption of the specific attributes of the movement, its stigmatization. The leader’s attention was focused on the criticism against the US policy in the region and on the accented analysis of the Israeli position. Several specific religious and secular dates related to the development of ideas of Zaydi Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi followers were set to be celebrated. These holidays were the following: Zaidiyyaholiday “Id la-Gadir” (the farewell preachment of the Prophet), that was sometimes banned by the republican authorities due to the security reasons; the Birthday of the Prophet (Moulad Nabaviy), common for the majority of Sunni and Shia, but condemned by the Wahhabis; and the day of Palestine, that allowed to attract the audience to the Palestinian issues. The terrorist acts of 9/11/01 that provoked a shock among Muslims and the US military intervention in Iraq in 2003 as well have become the turning point for the ideological development of the Houthi movement. Zaydi Hussein al-Houthi believed that the responsibility for fighting the extremist ideologies lies primarily upon the leaders of the countries themselves. He condemned the delegation of this duty to the US, the politics of which he considered adversary to Islam and explicitly pro-Israeli. He was one of the first to consider Al-Qaeda as one of the means of the US military intervention in the Middle East in order to divide its society. In 2003 the Houthis have adopted a specific slogan “Death to the USA! Death to Israel! Shame to the Israeli! Victory to Islam!” that they yelled after the Friday religious services.
The third phase overlaps with the tragic Sa'dah wars that lasted from June 2004 to February 2010. Besides regular governmental forces the Houthis were opposed by Islah militia. The commander of the governmental coalition General Ali Mohsen, well-known for his sympathies to Wahhabismand close contacts with Saudi military elites, widely used the Jihadist rhetoric against the Houthis. This factor has led to the rapid transformation of the Houthi movement into a strong armed resistance with the participation of Sa'dah tribes, who came to their rescue because of the genocide threat. Despite the broad information warfare against the Houthi, the new leader of the movement Sayid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi (who has replaced his brother killed in September 2004) strictly followed the defensive character of his struggle and gave no reasons to suspect him of promoting the Imamite tendencies or rebuilding monarchy in Yemen – the issues that were incriminated to the movement. Just the same, no facts of Iranian involvement in the conflict were found (except the condemnation of the military actions against local Zaydi population).
In 2009 before the beginning of the sixth act of war against the Houthi President Saleh completely renounced all the accusations connected with the “Iranian trace”. The sixth war could not have happened if not for the position of General Ali Mohsen and the Saudi funding, which became the first act of open involvement of Saudi Arabia in the Yemeni conflict on the side of governmental coalition. However, Saudi military have been captured by the Houthi and that has enabled the transition of the conflict into the settlement stage in January 2010.
The Sa'dah wars had a catastrophic influence on the economic and humanitarian situation on the North of Yemen. More than 200 thousand people were left without shelter (one third of Sa'dah province), about 10 thousand were dead and dozens of thousands people of all ages became angry on Saleh regime because they were oppressed by his security services. In 2013 President Hadi offered official apology to the Houthi for all the suffering caused by the unjust wars declared by the regime.
These wars have forged the military might of Ansar Allah, which relied on the effective and disciplined units with warlords in the head (so called militia), that were armed by the government issued weapons from Yemeni army and even from disarmed Saudi units. However, Sayid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi continuously stressed his allegiance to the peaceful conflict resolution and the exclusively defensive nature of his movement. The most important issues for him were the just compensation of the war damage and the guarantees of the equal rights for all the Yemeni religious groups in the country. By the end of the war the Houthis possessed a developed propaganda machine that included printed and on-line editions and also a satellite channel Al-Masira, where they showed all the crimes of the regime and condemned the actions of “Takfirites” against the unity of the Yemeni society.
The fourth stage of the Houthi movement began with Yemeni revolution in February 2011 when Sayid Abdul-Malik became the first from the opposition to declare a full support to the ideals of the revolution started by city youth, and expressed his intention to fully dismantle Saleh’s regime in order to carry out the democratic reforms. The revolution and the peace process within the framework of the international plan of GCC initiative that began soon after it have opened for Houthis the road to transform into a political organization. However, the sudden move of General Ali Mohsen with a significant part of Yemeni army to Islah side in March 2011 did not allow this. The Houthis have realized that it was too early to give away the captured weapons and preferred to remain a movement or as they are sometimes called a “Jamaat”, that was called Ansar Allah in 2013. The prospect of General Ali Mohsen’s arrival at power created a fatal danger for all the Zaydi part of the country, which is the third of all population.
So, the dormant conflict between the Houthis and Islah has revived on the wide front and entered the active phase, having widened geographically compared to the Sa'dah wars. However, the fate of this confrontation was decided in favor of the Houthis by Saleh, who has engaged into a real battle with Islah (including General Ali Mohsen), where the President Hadi did not play an important role. Saleh has decided to use the Houthi as a strike force to defeat Islah and thus facilitated his victories in February-September 2014. The contribution of Saleh to the Houthi’s victories consisted of two elements: a.) The establishment of strict neutrality of the army in the Houthi-Islah armed conflict, including when it left the borders of the “Houthi” territories, and b.) Contribution to the divide in coalition of Hashed tribes, the majority of which turned off their supreme leader, Sheik Sadyk Al-Ahmar (from Islah) and took a friendly position towards the Hothis, remembering about their Zaydi origins.
The successful change of the “agreement government” of Basindawaby Ansar Allah in Sana and the simultaneous signing of the the Peace and National Partnership Agreement between all the main parties and movements (including Islah) under the aegis of Benomar in September 2014 meant the change of leaders in the political process inside Yemen. Islah has lost the ambitions of the main candidate for the power. The last undecided question about the integration of the Southern Movemen (al-Hirak) into the project of preservation of Yemeni unity was put on the agenda. The leaders of Ansar Allah have started paying their utmost attention to this question having launched intensive talks with al-Hirak on finding the compromise in the issue of the country’s federalization.
The causes of the grave deterioration of the political situation in Yemen that have led to the concerted voluntarily resignations of President Hadi and Prime Minister Bahah on the 22d of January 2015 should be examined particularly. I will just note that there were no signs of possible coup or breakdown of the mission of Special Councilor of UN Secretary General Benomar by the effort of the Houthis. After the resignation of Hadi Iran has shown its interest in the development of relations with Yemen in the conditions of its inability to borrow from traditional donors. But it is unlikely to become a true reason for the intervention.
via Al Arabiya English: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/05/26/How-can-Russia-contribute-to-the-fight-against-ISIS-.html
It’s a high time to look at the measures taken by the international community in the fight against ISIS and to ask ourselves a question: If we keep going like this, how soon will ISIS reach the borders of the West? How much has already been lost? How much are we ready to lose in the upcoming months in our unwillingness to change approach, to rethink the situation and to understand that in this war no one can get off lightly. We cannot remain aloof or only relatively involved through assistance and useless air strikes without a full-scale international ground operation and global involvement in the settlement process. While Western aid stays inefficient and insufficient, the countries devastated and suffering under ISIS are seeking other options.
The Iraqi premiere’s visit to Russia is a sign that the pressure of ISIS is becoming enormous and that the country is running out of forces to resist it and has little hope that the sufficient aid will finally come from the West.
Iraq has a long history of bilateral relations with Russia, the rise of which started in the epoch of the Soviet Union. Since 2003 and the U.S. intervention in Iraq, which was strongly condemned by Russia, the contact between the two countries was practically lost and the parties have spent years on rebuilding the ties and once prosperous cooperation. Russia invests a lot in the country even now, when the investments are very risky, and this is highly appreciated by the Iraqis. Russia’s president has mentioned that the overall trade turnover between the two countries stays relatively low, but it has grown ten-fold in the past two years even despite the deep crisis in the Middle East and the economic problems.
The visit of the Iraqi PM to Moscow is a continuation of the long and sustainable process of the bilateral relations building, but in the current historical moment it’s much more significant especially in terms of regional stability.
Russia, is a needed partner for Iraq in terms of the urgent weapons deliveries. Russia can really deliver the needed weaponry in the shortest time, with no any precondition or stipulation. Then the price on the Russian weapons is lower, while the quality is very high.
Iraqi military trade with Russia is not a new trend. What is new is the word “aid” that was used while talking about the military cooperation. According to Russian officials, it is eager to take all possible measures to assist Iraq in its fight against ISIS. Iraqi’s PM arrival to Russia for assistance and support doesn’t mean the break of its relations with its Western allies, while the criticism of them will rise in Iraqi decision-making circles. Nevertheless it does not mean that Russia competes with or ousts the traditional dominant players in the region. Firstly it has no such interests, as its presence in the region is still very limited and the region is not in its high priorities. Secondly it has no such capacities and influence.
The West has been willing to make Russia join the U.S. led anti-ISIS coalition for a long time. Opposing the core and philosophy of the ongoing operation that has no approval and mandate of the key international organization, Russia took the position of non-involvement in the direct fighting however keeping an eye on the processes there and cooperating with the regional powers in terms of security issues as well as delivering weapons to the allied Syrian regime, in what was seen with much skepticism and discontent by the international community. The threat of ISIS is far more tangible threat for Russia than for any other country outside the Middle East.
Now Russia, keen to condemn and demonstrate skepticism towards the coalition forces and measures taken, takes its own steps to contribute to the general attempts to stop the spread of ISIS. These steps and maneuvers are in the interests of all the players.
The problem of the ISIS spread, the barbarity and mass killings that follow each of their victories, needs to be countered by a common and united response. There will soon be a point of no-return, when either we send ISIS to hell or this world is turned into hell by ISIS.
Russia’s recently declared decision to lift the embargo on S-300 deliveries to Iran has a particular meaning and puts Moscow in the face of hard decisions to be made.
The term “S-300” - referring to long-range surface-to-air missile systems that have been in service since 1978 - has already become an international term of discord that appears regularly enough on the world agenda. .
The system has a next generation version, S-400, and an absolutely new version – S-500 – will reportedly soon be seen. Russia had signed a contract to deliver it to Iran in 2007. Then the delivery was cancelled. The official reason for this step was the sanctions imposed by a U.N. Security Council resolution. But several experts suggested that the true reason of the delay was Netanyahu’s visit to Moscow at that same time and his promise not to deliver arms to Georgia, as well as remarkable pressure from the U.S. Five years later and Russia has lifted the embargo, met with a controversial international reaction.
S-300, even being a rather old system and having an absolutely defensive design, could be a game changer in the geopolitical battles in the Middle East and over it. The possibility of Russia’s S-300 delivery to Syria was a matter of deep concern to the international community.
And even there is no proof of the S-300 delivery to the Syrian regime; a significant number of experts believe it is being delivered. Thus this uncertainty, besides other factors, has prevented the international community from the repetition of the Libyan scenario in Syria.
The main player that opposes any S-300 delivery – is Israel, which believes that S-300 shipments will break the relative balance of forces existing in the region and will make it more vulnerable in the face of the Iranian threat. Saudi Arabia does not approve of the Russia’s decision as well. Russia’s support of Iran and condemnation of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen strains the country and aggravates the relations between the two powers. S-300 delivery causes strong debates in Europe and in the U.S., however the reaction coming from the White House was surprisingly calm, as Obama was “frankly surprised that it [the ban] held this long.”
To read the whole piece : http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/05/02/Russia-s-S-300-missiles-Let-the-games-begin.html